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BOOK REVIEWS
Some Observations on Recent Criticism
of the Warren Court
By Alexander M.
Bickel. New York: Harper & Row, 1970. Pp. xii, 210. $6.50.
POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE WARREN COURT. By Philip B.
Kurland. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970. Pp. xxv, 222.
$9.75.
When two "scholarly critics"' of the Supreme Court such as
Professors Alexander M. Bickel and Philip B. Kurland publish
articulate and thoughtful analyses of the Court's actions over the past
several decades, their messages can hardly be ignored. This is
particularly so in the case of their recent books because of the large
degree of similarity in the views they express. 2 Both Bickel and Kurland
say, in substance, that the Warren Court tried to do too much too fast,
that what it did was not done well, and that its major decisions are
unlikely to be of lasting significance. As an admitted aficionado of the
Warren Court 3 I cannot resist the temptation to take issue with many
of the key substantive points made in the two books. I shall take a
somewhat different tack, however, both initially and in conclusion, for,
in my view, these books raise an equally important matter of continuing
significance. This is the difficult problem of assaying the proper role
of the Court's critics, which, of course, will survive current criticism
of the Warren Court.
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS.

I.

THE ROLE OF A SUPREME COURT CRITIC

Professor Kurland's book provides a poignant description of the
Court critic's dilemma. In it he suggests that public confidence in the
Court might be significantly greater if "the attitudes expressed by its
critics in academe were representative of the best thought in society"
(p. 201). But Kurland says that he doubts that this proposition is true,
I. Judge J. Skelly Wright has aptly dubbed Bickel and Kurland with this title. Wright,
Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and The Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REv.769, 770
n.6 (1971).
2. Both books are also similar in that they were prepared from the Holmes and Cooley
lecture series delivered by the respective authors at Harvard and Michigan law schools in the fall
of 1969, shortly after Earl Warren's retirement as Chief Justice.
3. See Beytagh, On Earl Warren's Retirement: A Reply to Professor Kurland, 67 MIcH.
L. REV. 1477 (1969).
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and then laments the fact that academic attitudes "are not necessarily
representative of anyone except those in these sheltered groves" (id.).
If one assumes the truth of the latter statement, it is hard to see how
the Court would be better off if the populace adopted the attitude of
the Court's critics, because the Warren Court comes off rather badly
at the hands of both Bickel and Kurland. Yet, this inherent ambiguity
in function and purpose presents a real and difficult dilemma for the
critic who is a serious and knowledgeable student of the Court.
In their respective books, Bickel and Kurland state that from an
historical perspective the public's confidence in the Court as an
institution was at one of its lowest ebbs when Earl Warren stepped down
as Chief Justice. Given the accuracy of the polls to which they refer,
this would appear to be so. Both authors view this phenomenon with
regret because of the Court's need to maintain the confidence of its
constituency. As they surely realize, however, the Court hardly can seek
to mirror some common denominator of public opinion on the difficult
matters that come before it, such as protection of minorities through
interpretation and application of the broad and vague commands of the
Bill of Rights. As Judge Wright has pointed out, ours is a constitutional
democracy with a firmly embedded notion of judicial review, 4 a point
to which Bickel and Kurland give only a passing nod. Thus, the Court
fulfills its role more properly by adopting those ideas and concepts that
represent the best in contemporary society within the framework of our
written Constitution. Critics of the Court can help it carry out this
function; yet, in large measure, critics like Bickel and Kurland have
plainly failed to do so.
One problem facing any critic is a determination of the audience
to which his message should be directed. Bickel and Kurland obviously
did not direct their message either to the general public or to all lawyers,
for they must have known that anyone not a student of the Court would
have a difficult time understanding their books. Therefore, they must
be regarded as addressing a narrower audience comprised of perhaps a
few thousand members of the judiciary, law professors, lawyers, law
students, political scientists, and journalists having a special interest in
the Court. Still, their books, and others like them, do have an
immeasurable impact on members of the public when they realize that
respected scholars have reached the same conclusions about the Warren
Court as those conveyed to them through the news media. To the extent,
then, that these works are thought to contain friendly and constructive
4.

Wright, supra note 1, at 787.
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criticism, the effort is in all likelihood counter-productive.
Timeliness is probably the most important aspect of serious
criticism. Both Bickel and Kurland must have felt that prompt appraisal
of the Warren Court was desirable, for they hardly waited for the dust
to settle. In an era grown accustomed to instant history, this eagerness
is understandable. It may prove unfortunate, however, because only
through the leavening that comes with the passage of time can one
adequately and accurately evaluate the work of the Warren Court.
Despite their articulateness, the efforts of Bickel and Kurland strike me
as being premature and overgeneralized. Although each pays lip service
to the difference, their books signally fail in drawing the important
distinction between criticism of the Court as an institution and attack
on individual decisions, trends, and personalities. Their works may be
characterized, perhaps too glibly, as early overkill. More importantly,
the impressions created by such eminent scholars can do real harm in
helping to bring about the fulfillment of their prophecy. Of course, if
Bickel and Kurland are proved correct by history, their message will
be recalled and saluted; if they are proved wrong, few will remember
or care.
In light of the above criticisms, one properly might ask what
scholarly critics of the Court like Bickel and Kurland should do? They
certainly should not hold their tongues for years, thereby avoiding any
current appraisal of the Court's work. But they can provide a useful
service by avoiding some of the excesses in which Bickel and Kurland
have seemed to engage. For example, they might speak more
tentatively-and less apocalyptically-to a broad audience about
particular things the Court did or failed to do. They might be more
circumspect in their conclusions, realizing that they too are applying a
set of value judgments to problems-procedural as well as
substantive-that the Court has necessarily faced. They might also seek
to avoid misleadingly simplistic denigration of the very institution that,
as loyal Frankfurterians, they purport to revere. They might be less
snobbish in their characterizations of the Court as anti-intellectual,
unprincipled, and lacking in style and persuasiveness. Finally, they
might concede more openly the great difficulty of the problems the
Warren Court faced and be willing to indulge in just a bit of charity,
at least insofar as the good faith of the Justices is concerned. In short,
they might be a little less petulant and a little more humble. Failing
that, they might at least ask themselves whether they should speak out
publicly at all, especially if their message is limited to the Justices and
a few of their brethren in academe.
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The Bickel work is especially interesting in that the author does
not limit himself to the Warren Court's "failures of method," but rather
points to what he views as its errors of substance. 5 In other words, he
challenges the Court on the very ground upon which most of its critics
have previously been willing to concede its success-the soundness of
results achieved, as distinguished from the reasoning employed or
wisdom displayed by acting in certain matters.
After an introductory chapter detailing most of the major actions
taken by the Court during the Warren years, Bickel launches into an
interesting but unpersuasive discussion of "the idea of progress" that
he says guided the Court's entire enterprise. He suggests that the
Court's goal was a better society without regard for consistency or
contemporary validation. He argues that the Court's "new faith" in
egalitarianism as a constitutionally ordained precept was analogous to
an earlier Court's "old faith" in laissez-faire, and that both concepts
were doomed to failure. Much of Bickel's early discussion is actually
a eulogy of Frankfurter-a crucial and pre-eminent figure in Bickel's
view of the Court. He laments, however, that Frankfurter "never
achieved a rigorous general accord between judicial supremacy and
democratic theory" (p. 34). Bickel, presumably, could better his mentor
in this regard because he would not be confused by the thought patterns
that the Warren Court inherited from the "progressive realists" who
sat on the Court in the early part of the century. His resolution of the
Court's dilemma in endeavoring to avoid being antidemocratic is hardly
a satisfying one; he simply says that the Court should not intervene so
long as the "political process is operational" (p. 37). This simplistic
view ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was adopted with complete
cognizance of the availability and dangers of the political process. In
any event, some of the Warren Court's most important actions stemmed
directly from problems such as malapportionment and segregation,
which the political process had failed miserably to solve.
Bickel says that the Court's weak reasoning, lack of craftsmanship,
and "intellectual incoherence" can be aptly summed up by a notion
he terms "the web of subjectivity" (p. 47). His discussion of some of
the Warren Court's important decisions is particularly derogatory. For
example, the Court's misuse of history is "unjustifiable;" its holdings
5. Judge Wright discussed this at length and most perceptively in his extensive critique of
the Bickel book. Wright, supra note 1.
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worked a "palpable injustice" to certain individuals; it acted
"shockingly" in developing a concept of nonretroactivity; and, it
"gratuitously reached out" for issues in other cases. Some of these
points may be valid, but the extrapolation of an overbroad general theme
from them is an unsound leap in analysis.
The theme that "reason and principle alone justify the exercise of
supreme judicial power in a political democracy" (p. 95) is the source
of much of Bickel's criticism of the Warren Court. His principal
complaint stems from the Court's refusal to worship at the shrine of
the god of reason that he and his cohorts regard as sacred. There is
something sterile and superficial, however, about repeated charges that
the Warren Court was lacking in analytical facility, principled
judgment, and irrefutable reasoning. A disparate body of men, seeking
first and foremost to do justice in difficult cases touching the deepest
roots of our society, must apply some system of values in the course
of their decision-making. If, as Pascal told us, the heart often has
reasons that reason cannot know, result-oriented decision-making, the
bete noire of the "scholarly critics," may be far more consistent with
the Court's proper role than a rigid and unyielding obeisance to the
dictates of rationality.
In Bickel's final chapter, which he has entitled "Remembering the
Future," he goes beyond his criticism of how the Court did things and
squarely takes issue with what it did. He identifies the following main
themes of the Court's decisions: (1) egalitarianism, (2) majoritarianism,
(3) centralization and nationalization, and (4) legalization. Bickel
questions whether these themes are "in harmony with each other" (p.
115), though he does not indicate why harmony is necessarily a virtue
in this regard. He suggests that current social developments are moving
counter to the Court's main themes and that "society may not be
conforming to the Warren Court's vision" (p. 117) since, he asserts,
many people are turning to decentralization and diversity.
Bickel's analysis of the decision in Brown v. Board of Education6
is indicative. It is grounded on a societal model-Madison's idea of
"groups of minorities"-that, in his judgment, is contrary to the
Warren Court's "vision." He maintains that the centralizing and
nationalizing effects of Brown and its progeny are probably bad and
that Brown may be headed for irrelevance, at least in the area of
education (p. 151). Putting aside the matter of the Court's "vision"
when it decided Brown, I seriously doubt that anyone will regard that
seminal decision as irrelevant for many years to come. While the matter
6.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

1058

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 24

of de facto segregation still awaits resolution, the Court's recent decision
in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education7 exhibits an
abiding commitment, regardless of political pressure, to see that
desegregation is effectuated.
The reapportionment decisions of the Warren Court also are
subjected to criticism by Bickel. He says that the Court failed to focus
on the problem of "proper constituency formation" (p. 156), but he
gives us no better definition of what this might be-apart from a system
based on population-than did the dissenters in Reynolds v. Sims8 and
companion cases. How can a government be structured "in terms of
clearly defined interests" (p. 157), as he suggests, when the interests of
individuals are so diverse and disparate? People of "like interests" are
rather hard to find in a sophisiticated, pluralistic society such as ours.
The only sensible starting place, as the Court concluded in Reynolds,
is people, not "interests." Bickel's call for participatory democracy is
curious since one significant effect of the reapportionment cases might
well be to restore more of a balance between the federal government
and the states, including their political subdivisions. Nonetheless, Bickel
concludes that, like Brown, Reynolds is headed for "substantial
irrelevance" (p. 165). State legislators elected as a result of Reynolds
might disagree with him on this point.
In the end, despite his erudition and articulateness, Bickel really
has little to say. He concludes that because the Warren Court misread
the future, its major decisions "are heading toward obsolescence, and
in large measure abandonment" (p. 173). Ending with a whimper, he
says that the Court will probably endure despite its failures, that things
might not have worked out much differently if it had stringently followed
reason and principle, and that it might just save the country yet in a
time of great need. Surely, this is unnecessary cynicism. Granting that
the Warren Court made some mistakes, its dominant ethic of doing
individual justice in the cases that came before it can hardly be faulted.
If the Court actually had some settled "idea of progress," it was making
the concept of "equal justice under law" a reality for all who came
before it-the black, the indigent, the criminal defendant, the
disenfranchised. Much of what the Court did during those years may
become irrelevant and obsolescent in time, for few human decisions have
lasting significance, but its substantial reshaping of our society will have
a long-term impact. Moreover, its symbolic role during the Warren
years-what it was and not just what it did-was of inestimable value
7. 402 U.S. I (1971).
8. 377 U.S. 533, 587 (1964).
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to those citizens living, in President Kennedy's words, on the outskirts
of hope. When the final chapters are written on the Warren Court, it
is likely that the verdict will be rather more favorable than Bickel's.
B.

Kurland's Treatment of the Warren Court

Many of the observations in the Kurland book track those of
Bickel. On the whole, it is fair to say that Kurland is less biting and
cynical in his criticism and more understanding of the problems the
Court was called upon to handle. Kurland strains to prove that the
Warren Court did not create any of the major doctrines it sought to
effectuate, but this is hardly a telling criticism of the Court, for it is
the pattern of history generally. He also asserts that the Warren Court's
decisions have not been effectively implemented, but here he would
appear to be on shaky grounds factually. In any event, it is doubtful
that there has been adequate time for thorough implementation
and, moreover, this is a questionable measure to apply to the Court's
actions. Kurland categorizes the basic shortcomings of the Warren
Court as its unpersuasively reasoned opinions, its attempt to decide too
much, and its failure to recognize its own institutional weaknesses in
data-gathering and administration of broad rules. These criticisms
parallel Bickel's theme that the Court was too political. 9 Like Bickel,
Kurland says that in order to restore public confidence the Court must
seek to persuade rather than coerce. Neither writer, however, explains
how public confidence in the Court would be restored by more carefully
reasoned opinions. Since few members of the public ever read Court
opinions, the point that Bickel and Kurland seek to make must be that
better reasoning would lead, at least in some cases, to results more
palatable to a majority of the people. Almost two hundred years of
history sufficiently contradict the characterization of the Court implicit
in this assumption.
Kurland's first chapter is aptly entitled "The Tyranny of Labels."
It effectively disposes of a number of shibboleths frequently used to
characterize the Court and its members. It also develops a distinction,
which Kurland continues to use throughout the book, between the
judicial mode and the political or legislative mode of acting on public
issues.' 0 One is reminded that those who support an activist Court must
be willing to accept decisions that meet with their disfavor-a point that
9. At one point Kurland makes a gratuitous, obnoxious, and wholly unnecessary reference
to courts "in Hitler's Germany, in Stalin's Russia, and in the Union of South Africa" (p. xxiv).
10. He does admit that both modes involve rulemaking processes, but of a different type
(p. 174).
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seemed rather obvious until Richard Goodwin made an issue of it."
Finally, Kurland hedges his bet on how history will view the Warren
Court (p. 13), but this does not deter him from passing judgment.
The second chapter on "The Congress, the President and the
Court" is a rather low-key discussion that points up little direct conflict
between the Warren Court and the other branches of the federal
government. On the other hand, it notes that Congress found
considerable displeasure with the Court's actions. Kurland downgrades
the Court's role in "legitimizing" congressional actions because its
opinions were "shabby" and the results achieved "hardly came as a
surprise to anyone" (p. 35). In discussing the executive branch, he
underscores the importance of the President's appointment power as a
check on the Court and the probable effect of changes in personnel. The
Burger Court's performance thus far has amply validated this
2
observation.
In his next chapter, entitled "Federalism and the Warren Court,"
Kurland discusses the Court's role in effectively transferring power from
the states to the federal government through the medium of its decisions.
Although what he has in mind is far from clear, he says that the Court's
imposition of national standards on state criminal processes violated
"what federalism is all about" (p. 82). Conceding that revision in the
criminal procedure and racial discrimination areas was needed, Kurland
does not seriously fault the Court for the results it achieved in those
areas. On the other hand, Kurland has something of a fixation on the
nefarious purposes supposedly underlying the Court's reapportionment
decisions and also a pathological conviction that they have been wholly
ineffective. In this area, he naively suggests that the Court grossly
overreacted to "a bad case of acne" (p. 83). Kurland regards the
reapportionment decisions as an unprincipled ipse dixit on a matter
beyond the proper ken of the institution, thereby distinguishing himself
from Bickel who thinks the decisions were a misguided attempt to return
power to the people. While Kurland likes decentralization and would
reinvigorate local governments, his suggestions are hardly more realistic
than Bickel's reliance on the political process to work out difficult
questions of public policy.
After repeating Bickel's litany of procedural criticisms, Kurland
turns increasingly to the Warren Court's fixation with egalitarianism,
which, for him, was its hallmark. He correctly notes that equality is
11. Goodwin, The Shape of American Politics, COMMENTARY, June 1967, at 26-27.
12. For a pained and poignant lament about the trend of Court decisions during the last
term see Justice Brennan's dissent in Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 845 (1971).
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an elusive and amorphous concept that is not self-defining. This leads
into his discussion of Brown whose aftermath, he says, showed that the
Court was "incapable of effecting fundamental changes in society" (p.
113). This observation, however, misses the point for, in my judgment,
it fails to consider the contribution that the judicial process can and
should make in the resolution of thorny problems, such as segregation,
by serving as a catalyst and a conscience.
Kurland's extensive discussion of the Warren Court's grappling
with the "state action" concept seems pointless. Since congressional
action was imminent and in fact eventually occurred, the Court's failure
to resolve the ultimate issue presented in the sit-in cases 3 is a good
example of the sort of judicial self-restraint that the "scholarly critics"
ordinarily applaud. The absence of a thoroughgoing rationale for the
"state action" concept, however, bothers Kurland greatly; but, in view
of the lack of practical significance the question now has, his criticism
resembles a law professor's fetish for the settlement of an intriguing
doctrinal point. Even he concedes that the Court may have moved
beyond the issue in United States v. Guest 4 and Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co.' 5 by upholding antidiscrimination legislation based upon the
thirteenth and fourteenth amendments.
Kurland's discussion of the freedom versus equality dilemma is
interesting, as is his treatment of the Court's uncertain approach to the
"reverse discrimination" problem. But his handling of the
reapportionment cases, as indicated previously, leads one to conclude
that he must have lost a bet on how they would come out." His reference
to a developing notion of "substantive equal protection" is intriguing
but incomplete. Moreover, his Orwellian fears about conformity and
uniformity resulting from the egalitarian notions the Court has spawned
are surely overstated. Much inequality of opportunity still exists, and
our country is very far from being a single-value society. Furthermore,
the main thrust of egalitarianism has been to remedy gross, glaring, and
unjustifiable inequities, not to produce the dull sameness that troubles
Kurland.
In his final chapter, entitled "Problems of a Political Court,"
Kurland returns to his differentiation between the judicial and legislative
modes. By acting too much in the legislative mode, he reasons, the Court
has "endangered its capacity to perform its peculiar function" (p. 172)
13.
14.
15.
16.

E.g.. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
383 U.S. 745 (1966).
392 U.S. 409 (1968).
For a more extensive discussion in this regard see Beytagh, supra note 3.
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of protecting minorities. He quickly notes, however, that the "Court's
actions have occurred primarily in the area where enhanced legislative
responsibility will not work" (p. 179) because of the limitations of the
political process. In this respect, Kurland is surely closer to reality than
Bickel, who places far more confidence in the political process. While
the Court must conserve its power to act effectively, and can do so by
operating in the judical mode, whether the Court should act or stay its
hand in a particular situation is a subtle question of judgment. In my
view, the Warren Court stayed reasonably within the bounds of the
judicial mode so as not to spend its authority unwisely or unnecessarily.
Kurland has not made out a convincing case to the contrary.
Some of Kurland's concluding points merit comment. He discusses
in cogent fashion the institutional limitations on the Court as a
policymaker. The recitation of his "personal beliefs"1 7 about the Court
is also illuminating. He says the Court is undemocratic-but perhaps
it must indulge in some amount of "political" activity to function
effectively. He informs us that the Court is anti-majoritarian-but,
again, that is what was intended, although the point he makes about
the Court's preservation of its ability to act is well taken. Finally, he
concludes that the Warren Court's failure to persuade people generally
of the soundness of its decisions caused a serious crisis of confidence
in the Court as an institution. Yet, the rather general crisis of confidence
that presently exists with regard to all of our governmental institutions
makes it far from clear that the Court would have come off better by
acting differently.
III.

CONCLUSION

This crisis of confidence in our institutions brings me back to the
earlier points made about the role of the Court critic. It is commonplace
that events of the 1960's have led many to question our ability to govern
ourselves. There is much polarization, divisiveness, and, if you will,
social schizophrenia. In many minds there are gaps existing between
blacks and whites, rich and poor, educated and uneducated, young and
old that simply cannot be bridged. Some seriously question the basic
premises on which our society has been structured, and some want to
tear that structure down, though it remains unclear what they would replace it with. Our society's institutions are veritable targets for the disaffected; the courts and universities are among the most important of
17. Kurland's use of this phrase to describe his concluding observations is somewhat curious
and confusing for it leads the reader to wonder how earlier remarks-spread across some 200
pages-should be characterized.
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those institutions. Because of their importance, availability, and vulnerability, they have been, and continue to be, subjected to a continuing
tirade of abuse. Whether the courts and universities can long withstand
such attacks is uncertain, for they are probably the most defenseless and
fragile of our institutions. At this juncture in our history, when a
common bond of mutual understanding and constructive support should
unite court and college, it is peculiar and a bit ironic that the academic
world has produced some of the judiciary's most vocal critics. Neither
court nor college can probably survive the forces that oppose them and
adjust to the new demands being placed upon them without help from
each other. If the scholarship of men like Bickel and Kurland tends in
the end to disserve their purposes, then some questions can legitimately
be raised about the worth of it. And if in tearing down the Court they
confirm the idea of a general institutional malaise, then they unwittingly
assist those who would undermine their own institutions-the
universities-as well. Perhaps this analysis is overly simplistic, but it
is something, I would suggest, that Bickel and Kurland and others like
them could profitably ponder.
When two thoughtful scholars such as Bickel and Kurland agree
on so much about the Warren Court, there must be something to what
they say. Indeed, there is much erudition and food for thought in these
two books. But there is a great deal lacking in analysis and approach
as well. If the two writers had contented themselves with careful and
articulate discussions of what the Court did and how it did it, if they
had spoken to a wider audience and sought to help that audience
understand the Court as an institution, and if they had been somewhat
more reluctant to indulge in premature prognosis and overgeneralized
characterization of Chief Justice Warren's tenure, their products might
have served all of us-bench, academe, bar, and public-far better. It
would seem, however, that "scholarly critics" are no more inclined to
that sort of approach than, in their minds, are the Justices they are wont
to criticize.
FRANCIS X. BEYTAGH, JR.*
*

Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. B.A. 1956, Notre Dame; J.D. 1963, University

of Michigan.
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Law and Social Change
POLITICS OF SOUTHERN

EQUALITY: LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN A

By Frederick M. Wirt. Chicago: Aldine
Publishing Co., 1970. Pp. 335. $10.00.
MISSISSIPPI

COUNTY.

I.

BACKGROUND

Professor Frederick M. Wirt's book is a study of the impact of
the federal civil rights statutes of 1957, 1960, 1964, and 1965, and the
United States Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education,
on the residents and institutions of Panola County, Mississippi. The
county-located in the northwestern part of the state-is more or less
typical of Mississippi both in population and in life style. While Panola
does have some industry, its residents are chiefly engaged in agriculture,
and a majority are black. The incomes of more than two-thirds of its
residents are below the poverty level, and, as one would expect, the
general educational level is quite low. Furthermore, most of the housing
is old and lacks many of the modern conveniences normally associated
with American life.
Economic conditions in Panola County have been significantly
affected by national agricultural policy, which, by making it profitable
for large landholders to reduce cotton acreage, has helped produce
large-scale unemployment of agricultural workers. Panola has
experienced a shift to cattle raising, but this has created few job
opportunities for the unskilled tenant farmer. The county has a surplus
of unskilled black labor; while employment in manufacturing has grown,
white workers have filled most of these jobs. As in most counties in
the rural South, young blacks are leaving for the North and West in
search of better economic opportunities. Professor Wirt's study is set
against the historical and legal background of the decisions of the
Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson2 and Brown. Plessy, which gave
constitutional sanction to racial segregation, bolstered white supremacy
throughout the United States. This resulted in the flowering of raw
racism in the South as well as acceptance and enforcement in the North
of various racial limitations on the black man's opportunity, hopes, and
aspirations. Indeed, these restrictions, designed in purpose and effect
to confine blacks to a permanently inferior status in society, were
accepted as the way things were supposed to be. Brown and the federal
legislation dealt with in the study eliminated this constitutional and legal
1.
2.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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support for white supremacy and helped spawn an era of black
militancy. Blacks are now demanding all the amenities of equal
citizenship status as of right and are insisting on acceptance by society
as blacks, with all that this means in terms of identification, values,
and a life style that differs from the white norm.
The struggle of the 1960's to increase black voting strength in
Panola, which the Brown decision helped produce, is a major concern
of Professor Wirt's study. Before the commencement of that struggle,
there were approximately 7,639 whites and 7,250 blacks of voting age
in the county. At least 5,343 whites were registered, and only two
blacks-one a 92-year old who had registered in 1892 and the other a
black who registered in 1952.3 Intimidation, fear, and threats of physical
and economic reprisals had kept most blacks disenfranchised. In
addition, registration required the would-be registrant to interpret the
constitution to the satisfaction of the registrar. While illiterate whites
were able to qualify with ease, educated blacks were uniformly rejected.
Racial segregation was a strictly observed custom in Panola prior
to 1960, and blacks were systematically deprived of any semblance of
either educational equality or equal economic opportunity. The rituals
which the protocol of a system of white superiority and black
subordination fostered were the commonplace social graces of the
county.
Despite the Civil War, the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth
amendments, and growing national pressure for a new deal in race
relations, Panola County as late as 1960 appeared to be securely
anchored in the past. The fetters of slavery seemed permanent, incapable
of disintegration. Much, of course, was bubbling below the surface in
black communities throughout Mississippi, but virtually no one would
have believed that within a few short years the state would explode into
civil rights activity, mass demonstrations, court litigation, voter
registration drives, economic boycotts of white businesses, organized
efforts to secure prosperity, and financial independence for the black
small farmer. Even those who were aware of this "revolutionary"
ferment did not suspect that the black voter would become a potent
political force in the state by 1968; that 81 black elected officials would
be holding local offices throughout the state in 1970;1 that in the 1971
3. The Negro who was registered in 1952 died before the litigation with which much of the
study is concerned reached the appellate level. After the filing of the lawsuit, but before trial, another
black was registered in 1962. The registration data cited are taken from the court's opinion. United
States v. Duke, 332 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1964).
4. Metropolitan Applied Research Center & Voter Education Project, Southern Regional
Council, National Roster of Black Elected Officials (Feb. 1970).
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statewide elections one black man would be running for Governor and
150 other blacks for local office.5 Furthermore, they would not have
predicted that breakthroughs in industry and agriculture, small but real,
would occur,' and that desegregation would become a fact of life in much
7
of the state by 1970.
II.

TEXTUAL ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY

Professor Wirt tells part of the astounding story of black progress
in the 1960's as it took place in Panola County. Since his purpose was
serious and dedicated scholarship, he carefully accumulated a massive
amount of factual detail by spending a great deal of time in the county
and talking to and corresponding with a varied number of principal and
peripheral personalities. Therefore, his study is well researched and is
recommended as a detailed account of civil rights activities in both
Panola County and the State of Mississippi during the 1960's.
The stated objectives of Professor Wirt's study are to "seek to
specify the conditions under which a given set of laws was effective,"
and, if successful, "to generalize the future chances of law inducing
change" (p. 12). The author does not merely propose to isolate the
conditions under which law is capable of successfully regulating and
modifying behavior patterns and institutional response. His larger
ambition is to appraise the impact of law upon values and attitudes as
well.
At the outset, Professor Wirt informs us that there are two
conflicting schools of thought concerning law and social change. One
school contends that law can only mirror the established values in
society and cannot legislate morality nor lead society where it does not
wish to go. The other view is that law can successfully effectuate
attitudinal changes. Professor Wirt's purpose is to demonstrate the
5. NEWSWEEK, Aug. 2, 1971, at 22, gives the number of blacks who filed to run as 150,
but other estimates are higher.
6. Some industry has been attracted to Fayette, Mississippi, by Charles Evers, its black
mayor and candidate for Governor. The West Batesville Farmers Cooperative, to which reference
is made in this book, provides "custom harvesting, combining, and marketing services" for 265
members. The co-op was.organized in 1965 by a group of small farmers, SNCC organizers, and
a representative of the National Cooperative Fund. The immediate objective in forming the coop was to free the black independent Panola farmer from the power of a white okra buyer who
had a monopoly on their crops. The co-op completed its fourth season in 1969. Beset at first with
financial, management, and record-keeping difficulties, it has nonetheless survived and seems to
be overcoming these problems. Not yet a sound business venture, its future prospects are greatly
improved. For more details about this and other cooperatives see F. MARSHALL & L. GODWIN,
COOPERATIVES AND RURAL POVERTY IN THE SOUTH 53-55 (197 1).
7. N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1971, at 59, col. 4, describes the Mississippi school system as "now
one of the most desegregated in the nation."
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validity of the latter thesis and to define the circumstances under which
law can succeed in altering opinions and concepts, modifying not only
custom and usage but perceptions and perspectives as well.
There is, however, a third view held by pragmatists and activists,
including some social scientists, who refuse to concern themselves with
the law's effect on what people think or how they feel. For them the
critical issue is: how accomplished is the law in regulating public
conduct? They have little patience with the thesis that attitudinal change
must also be one of the objectives of law reform. This reaction is
understandable in the race relations field, since emphasis on the level
of personal sentiment has usually meant opposition to whatever
governmental sanction was being proposed.
In my judgment, those who focus on the law's efficacy in regulating
behavior and institutional response in the race relations field have by
far the better argument. Working from that limited perspective, there
are a number of valuable studies showing how in the race relations area
the law can accomplish effective social engineering. 8 Most of these
studies have come to a common-sense conclusion, bolstered by
experience, that the law's social objectives in race relations can best be
assured by a clear and unequivocal statement of policy, firm law
enforcement, and a refusal to tolerate minor evasions.9 These studies,
it seems to me, have provided a sufficiency of utilitarian knowledge on
how to induce social change through law. Moreover, we know that law
itself constitutes a choice of values. Hence, it necessarily reinforces some
attitudes and weakens others. Attitudinal change is thus an indirect
consequence of effective law enforcement. This is no less true in the race
relations field.'"
Professor Wirt adds no new insight in concept, methodology, or
analysis to what we learned from these earlier studies, and his findings
are substantially similar. Although his study provides little to increase
our knowledge of the effect of law on behavior and attitudes, it could
conceivably be of value as pure empirical scholarship. It seems to me,
however, that the work is fatally flawed even when assessed on that level.
8.

E.g., 0.

(1957); R. WILLIAMS & M.
(1954); Clark, Desegregation:An Appraisal of the Evidence, 9
J. Soc. IssuEs 2 (1953). See also A. BLUMROSEN, BLACK EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW (1971);
M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATIONS IN EMPLOYMENT (1966).
9. See Clark, supra note 8.
10. M. BERGER, EQUALITY BY STATUTE: THE REVOLUTION IN CIVIL RIGHTS (1967), a work
that deserves more attention, discusses law and social change in this context and concludes that
in changing behavior law transforms attitudes and values. Pettigrew, Complexity and Change in
American Racial Patterns:A Social Psychological View, 94 DAEDALUS 974 (1965) is of the same
view.
CARMICHAEL & W. JAMES, THE LOUISVILLE STORY

RYAN, SCHOOLS IN TRANSITION
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If Professor Wirt's purpose was to measure the impact of law on the
racial attitudes of white Panola County residents, it strikes me as
conceptually erroneous to equate reform in this area with attempts to
deal with other social problems as he seems to do by asking: "Why
did the abolition of slavery work while the abolition of liquor did not?"
(p. 10). American racism, we have come to realize, is a singular quality
of American life. It is unique, separate, and apart from all else that
effects how we think, feel, act, or respond. The depth, special quality,
and tenacious hold of American racism that have disfigured our lives
for so long aie only now being illuminated by informed scholarship."
Professor Wirt should have concentrated more on plumbing the
depths and meaning of racial attitudes in Panola County to give his
work scholarly quality and importance. He finds racial prejudice
deplorable, but his failure to appreciate its pervasive and intrusive effects
is made manifest at those critical points in the study when he is stating
what he regards as the impact the law had achieved. For his purposes
it was enough to paint a generalized profile of white Panola County
residents' racist attitudes. Yet to say that white Mississippians hold
racial prejudice is not enough. I would not make so much of this except
that Professor Wirt's stated objective-to evaluate the impact of law
on values and attitudes, meaning here racial values and
attitudes-required that he do more to inform us about the nature of
these racial attitudes and values than he chose to do. Perhaps as a
consequence of this failure, the study reflects an insufficient appreciation
of the heroic role local blacks played in the effort to secure
implementation of the various laws with which the book is concerned.
The role of local blacks is favorably mentioned, but the author's true
heroes seem to be the attorneys in the Civil Rights Division of the United
States Department of Justice 12 and the white volunteer students who
came to Mississippi in large numbers to assist in the COFO (Council
of Federated Organizations) statewide voter registration drive.
11. Three brilliant studies-D. DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE
(1966); G. FREDERICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE DEBATE ON AFROAMERICAN

CHARACTER AND

DESTINY

(1971);

W.

JORDAN,

WHITE OVER

BLACK: AMERICAN

ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE NEGRO 1550-1812 (1968)-have traced the origin, development, and
manifestations of American racist ideology to the eve of World War I. From Frederickson's work,
we learn that democratic tenets and racial discrimination are inextricably tied together- white
equalitarianism and anti-black bias. As a result of these studies and those they generate, we may
achieve a fuller understanding of the reasons for the pervasiveness of racism in this society.
12. For a far less favorable view of the Department of Justice and its operations during
this period see Burns, The Federal Government and Civil Rights in SOUTHERN JUSTICE 228 (L.
Friedman ed. 1965). A chief criticism of the Department at that time was its failure to protect
local blacks from physical violence in their attempt to exercise their rights.
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At one point, Professor Wirt writes: "I found in Panola that those
[blacks] who had co-operated with John Doar had a deep drive for
freedom and a sense of needing a better life, two objectives they linked
closely" (p. 78). 13 "But," he continues, "blacks were not without fears
about their co-operation . . . .They were often reluctant to tell what
they knew . . . fearing such cooperation would get out into the
community. The mass of this fear, reinforced by an apathy shaped by
past frustrations, was enormous" (pp. 78-79). How could anyone
familiar at all with the nature of race relations in Mississippi have
expected anything else? What should have evoked Professor Wirt's
comment was not the presence of the fear but the fact that as early as
1961, Department of Justice lawyers were able to secure in Panola
County a sufficient number of blacks as witnesses in a lawsuit by the
Government against the local registrar, despite the real and terrible
dangers that this public exposure was likely to cause. The courage of
local blacks, therefore, enabled the Department of Justice to file, try,
and win United States v. Duke on appeal, which resulted in opening
the registration rolls to large numbers of blacks before enactment of
the Civil Rights Act of 1965.
Neither the Department of Justice attorneys nor northern
volunteers could operate in a vacuum. They succeeded only because the
"deep drive for freedom" was an overwhelming and universal force in
Panola's black community -manifested strongly by some and feebly by
others. Local blacks were the real heroes. The enormity of the courage,
guts, and will that was required for local blacks to challenge the white
community by seeking to register and in cooperating with federal
authorities is simply inestimable. Other figures in this struggle, while
vital and necessary, cannot be cast in a heroic mold. That is the exclusive
preserve of the local blacks.
Professor Wirt's ignorance or naivete concerning Mississippi race
relations is again evident in his description of the implementation of
Title VI. He seems to understand that "freedom of choice" places the
burden of integration on black parents and children. He concludes,
however, that integration in Panola County, with freedom of choice in
effect, has been limited because blacks found the academic standards
in the white schools shockingly high, and, as a result, large numbers
of blacks transferred back to the all-black schools after a year or two
of integration. I regard this as misplaced cause and effect. If school
authorities had assumed their responsibility for school integration, pupil
13. At the time, John Doar was Burke Marshall's chief assistant and subsequently succeeded
Marshall as head of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice.
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reassignment would have been on a system-wide basis. These authorities
were aware of and should be accountable for the academic deficiencies
in the black schools. It was their responsibility not only to reorganize
the school district so that segregated pupil assignment would be
eliminated but also to initiate massive remediation programs as a
necessary ingredient of success in school desegregation.
To Professor Wirt, laggardness in the area of faculty integration
was a result of the fears of the black teachers. He reports that one of
the best black teachers threatened to leave the state if required to transfer
to the white school (p. 226). This is both a superficial analysis and an
erroneous judgment. Failure to achieve faculty integration was the result
of the policies and procedures of school authorities. Individual black
teachers should not have been singled out as the cause for this failure,
particularly in a study promising to give a disciplined account of the
role of law in effectuating change.
In a-number of instances Professor Wirt forgets his role of scientific
objectivity. He offers advice, for example, to black political leaders to
form coalitions with white officials. The ballot, he says, will be a useful
black tool "when it is concerned with the issues which cost the whites
little to change, have a limited visibility among whites, involve the
whites' sense of fairness and impartiality and lie within the public sector
of community life" (p. 171).14 This can hardly pass for objective
scientific knowledge or even professional wisdom. What we are offered
is the author's personal views, obviously weighted with his own biases
and conceits, as to how blacks may best pursue their political objectives.
Whatever its intrinsic value, deigning to give it is excessively patronizing.
Moreover, any political leader who would act on that kind of advice
would not remain in politics very long. It is altogether obvious that no
political movement can survive if its members seek only to achieve
meaningless and unimportant gains through the political process.
III.

CONCLUSION

My concluding assessment is that Professor Wirt's study seems
curiously dated. Concern with the ways and means by which law could
successfully induce social change was at a high point among civil rights
observers during the 1950's and 1960's. In the immediate aftermath of
Brown, there was a great deal of faith in the law as an effective
14. R. MURPHY & H. GULLIVER, THE SOUTHERN STRATEGY 199-226 (1971), on the other
hand, seems to accept the reality that blacks, like all other segments of the American electorate,
will vote in what they regard as their self-interest and views this as necessarily leading to improved
race relations in the South.
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instrument of reform. Disillusionment came, but belief in the efficacy
of law as a lever for progress in race relations remained the dominant
factor even through the sit-ins and mass demonstrations of the 1960's.
Today, however, the law's utility as a means of securing political,
economic, and social equality for nonwhites is being seriously
questioned. Blacks who once believed in federal law as the key to full
equality now see the law as an instrument of oppression. The law
requires equal educational opportunity, but educational deprivation of
black children remains the norm. Employment and housing
discrimination are prohibited by law, yet these practices continue
virtually unabated either because power enclaves have succeeded in
frustrating the effective reach of federal and local laws against
discrimination or because institutional racism has become so normalized
and entrenched that law is impotent to move the massive forces that
seek to preserve the status quo of racial inequities. Many are now
contending that the injustices in our system will not be eliminated
through law reform. They argue that only when nonwhite minorities are
able to secure levers of political and economic power will they have the
means to make the society responsive and to alleviate its deep rooted
inequities.
ROBERT L. CARTER*

Reapportionment Reexamined
By Richard C. Cortner. Knoxville:
University of Tennessee Press, 1970. Pp. ix. 283. $10.00.

THE APPORTIONMENT CASES.

While the title "The Apportionment Cases" could well characterize
a much broader survey, Professor Richard C. Cortner's book is

primarily an in-depth study of the Supreme Court's landmark decisions
in Baker v. Carr' and Reynolds v. Sims.2 One might be led to believe
that this is simply a technical examination of the opinions in these allimportant cases and a criticism of the legal methodology by which the

Court utilized the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
to accomplish a veritable revolution in constitutional theory. From the
preface itself, however, we discover that the design of the book is not
* Member New York Bar. A.B. 1937, Lincoln University; LL.B. 1940, Howard University;
LL.M. 1941, Columbia University.
I. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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so limited. The author begins his discussion with an examination of the
origins of the cases in the states of Tennessee and Alabama, respectively.
This discussion contains interesting observations about the principal
actors involved in the two scenarios, a step-by-step analysis of the
litigation in each case, and, lastly, an examination of the judicial and
political impact of these momentous rulings. In the closing chapter, the
author makes some penetrating observations concerning the operation
of the judicial process in our constitutional system. His comparison of
3
the Court's exercise of judicial power in Brown v. Board of Education
with its subsequent action in the apportionment cases is particularly
interesting.
Written in a most readable style, Professor Cortner's work should
appeal not only to lawyers, judges, and political scientists, but also to
all citizens interested in obtaining an insight into the judiciary's recent
role within our governmental framework. The subject of apportionment,
however,'.is much broader than the particular aspects of the problem
dealt with by Professor Cortner. Although the reader will find within
its four corners some indication of the effects that the apportionment
decisions have had, the book is limited in this respect, perhaps for the
obvious reason that the full impact of these decisions cannot yet be
known. The author does discuss the effect of the rulings in bringing
about a dramatic shift of political power in state legislative assemblies
from rural to urban centers of population, but he makes little attempt
to assess other results. There is no analysis of drastic shifts in voting
strength in connection with innumerable subordinate units of state
government or of the impact of the "one man, one vote" principle in
the broad and important area of congressional redistricting.
Much has been written on the technical aspects of Baker v. Carr
and Reynolds v. Sims, and the present treatment adds nothing new from
this standpoint. On the other hand, Professor Cortner's analysis of the
judicial process and its potential for accomplishing needed changes in
the basic structure of government when other possible modes of redress
have proved fruitless is a valuable contribution to legal literature.
WILLIAM
3.
*

E.

MILLER*

349 U.S. 294 (1955).

Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. A.B. 1930, University of
Tennessee; LL.B. 1933, Yale University.

